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IN THE SUPR'EME COURT 
:of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
REMINGTON RAND, INC., a 
corporation, 
Respondent and Plaimtiff, 
vs. 
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S. 
:MACHADO, fdba A-1 TYPEWRITER 
COMPANY, Case No. 8379 
Defendants, 
vs. 
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH 
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a 
corporation, 
Appellants and G.arnishee Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case as outlined in defendants' 
brief are substantially correct, but plaintiff believes it 
will aid the Court to better understand the case if further 
facts are chronologically stated with reference to the 
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2 
manner in which the garnishee defendants, Dale E. Grant 
and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., became indebted 
to defendant Thurman E. 0 'Neil and the court proceed-
ings that followed. 
Thurman E. O'Neil owned and operated business ma-
chines outlets in Salt Lake City and Provo, both known 
as A-1 Typewriter Company (R. 42). In July of 1954 
these businesses were in serious financial condition and 
their doors were closed (R. 59). O'Neil, with an apparent 
intention of secreting his stock of merchandise, office fur-
niture and equipment from his creditors (R. 60) sought 
a method whereby he could dispose of the same without 
either he or his tranferee incurring liability under the 
Bulk Sales Law of Utah. One Hugh Snyder, an acquaint-
ance of O'Neil's introduced him to the defendant, Dale E. 
Grant (R. 43, 80), and a scheme was contrived whereby 
a store would be opened in Salt Lake City and the busi-
ness incorporated under the name, Utah Cash Register 
Exchange, Inc., and the business would receive the office 
furniture and equipment from O'Neil's Provo store and 
make sales of O'Neil's merchandise (R. 45, 46). Five 
valuable Sweda Cash Registers had been mortgaged to 
the Farmers State Bank at Woods Cross, Utah by O'Neil. 
Shortly after commencing his operation, Grant redeemed 
the chattel mortgage by payment of approximately $3,-
000.00 to the bank ( R. 82), using as funds cash which 0' 
Neil had obtained through the sale of certain office ma-
chines following the closing of his doors in Provo and 
Salt Lake City (R. 47, 49, 54). There was no opening 
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inventory taken at the time Utah Cash Register Exchange 
began its existence in August, 1954 (R. 84), nor were 
there any bills of sale from O'Neil to Grant or Utah 
Cash Register Exchange, Inc., covering the merchandise, 
furniture and equipment transferred (R. 93, 43). Dale 
Grant held 49·5 shares of stock in the corporation, his 
wife, P. F. C. Grant, held 3 shares, and his brother-in-
law, R. C. Collard, held the remaining 2 of the 500 shares 
authorized (R. 75). Although the business known as Utah 
Cash Register, Inc. was, according to public record, a 
corporation, Grant, O'Neil and Snyder had already 
agreed that they would each contribute to the business 
a certain amount of cash (R. 47) and, presumably, share 
in its profits. The business venture apparently operated 
smoothly until December of 1954 when it becmne evident 
that the business would not support Grant, O'Neil and 
Snyder (R. 48). In December, O'Neil made demand upon 
Grant for a sum in excess of $5,000.00 (R. 49, 50, 51) 
which O'Neil contended Grant owed him because of 0'-
N eil's contribution in cash, merchandise, furniture and 
equipment. Grant disputed the ·sum demanded by O'Neil 
and conferred with his attorney (R. 51, 61). Upon re-
turning from his attorney's office, Grant announced to 
Snyder and one E. F. White, an employee of his com-
pany, that he had "whittled him (O'Neil) down to $3650.-
00." Shortly thereafter O'Neil left the business, and was 
never paid any part of the money which Grant had in-
dicated as owing him (R. 52). 
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In March of 1955, the attorneys for Remington Rand, 
Inc., which company had obtained a default judgment 
against O'Neil for $4,243.82 and costs (R. 19), were in-
formed of the above facts. Garnishments were served 
on Grant and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. (R. 11, 
13), and in their answers Grant stated that he was not 
indebted to O'Neil (R. 15), and Utah Cash Register Ex-
change, Inc. conveniently answered that the furniture 
and equipment at Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. 
was the property of O'Neil and that it claimed no inter-
est in it (R. 16). Remington Rand, Inc. traversed the 
garnishees' answers and noticed in the Law and Motion 
Division of the District Court for Salt Lake County a 
hearing to determine the amount of indebtedne·ss owed 
O'Neil by these garnishees. Replies were prepared to the 
garnishees' answers and were thought to have been ser-
ved on both Grant and O'Neil, although the original reply 
(R. 34) filed at the Salt Lake County Court House did 
not indicate service by mailing or otherwise. It was not 
until the garnishee judgment was entered by the Dis-
trict Court against Grant and Utah Cash Register Ex-
c:hange, Inc. that Remington Rand learned, by way of 
an affidavit filed in the action (R. 2'5), that Grant al-
legedly had not received a copy of the reply. The notice 
served on Grant calling up the hearing (R. 21) apprised 
Grant that plaintiff would attempt to establish his per-
sonal liability to O'Neil. A subpoena was served upon 
Grant (R. 36) for the express purpose of requiring him 
to bring with him to the hearing books and records of 
Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. which would show 
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transactions between Grant and O'Neil during the period 
in question. The Court, at the hearing's outset again ap-
prised Grant and his counsel that this would be a hearing 
to determine Grant's personal liability to O'Neil as well 
as that of the corporation (R. 40, 41), and with Grant 
sitting at the side of his aMorney at the counsel table, the 
proceedings went forward. Testimony was introduced in 
behalf of plaintiff, Remington Rand, and evidence was 
introduced by Grant. All witnesses were subjected to 
cross examination. The parties rested, arguments of 
counsel were heard and the District Court awarded a 
judgment in favor of O'Neil and against Dale E. Grant 
and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. in the sum of 
$3600.00, for the benefit of Remington Rand, Inc. (R. 17). 
The Court further announced that it found Utah Cash 
Register Exchange, Inc. to be the alter ego of Dale E. 
Grant. 
Within the next few days Remington Rand wasser-
ved with a notice and motion to vacate and set aside the 
garnishee judgment (R. 22), which motion was based on 
substantially the same grounds as are argued by appel-
lants on this appeal, and in addition, upon the ground 
that plaintiff had failed to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Grant's affidavit was appended to 
the motion. At the hearing the Court vacated the judg-
ment on the ground that it was not supported by Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 33), permitted plain-
tiff to immediately file such papers, and then entered 
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judgment nunc pro tunc in substantially the same form 
as the original judgment (R. 1). A further motion was 
filed by the garnishee defendants requesting that ce1:tain 
Findings of Fact be stricken (R. 29). The District Court 
considered the Findings and did strike five paragraphs 
of the same ·on stipulation of both parties (R. 6). A 
notice of appeal to this Court was filed by defendants 
on June 6, 195;5 (R. 31). 
STATEMENT OF POINT'S 
I. APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED NOTICE SUFFI-
CIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW. 
II. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
THE DEFENDANTS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF 
THAT AMOUNT ADMITTED AS OWING IN THE ANSWERS 
OF GARNISHEES. 
III. EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH 
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER 
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, BUT THE FINDING WAS NOT, 
AT ANY RATE, ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST GRANT PERSONALLY. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED NOTICE SUFFI-
CIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW. 
The plaintiff, at all times prior to the motion of 
garnishee defendants to vacate and set aside the judg-
ment, was of the impression that defendant Dale E. 
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Grant had a copy of the Reply to Answers of Garnishee'S. 
The writer personally placed the replies in envelope·s with 
the notices of the hearing to be held April 18, 1955, and 
mailed them to Grant and O'Neil, with copies of the no-
tice to their attorneys. But it is submitted that if Grant 
did not receive a copy of the reply to answers of garni-
shees, he should not have proceeded at the hearing, but 
should have objected to the procedure at that time as not 
giving him opportunity to prepare his case and demand 
a jury trial, if he wanted one. The Trial Court specifi-
cally informed Grant and his counsel as to what the 
hearing was designed to accomplish in the following 
words (R. 40): 
The Court: "Well, you are not taking any-
thing personally against Mr. Grant." 
Mr. Swan: ''Yes, Your Honor, we are. We 
have prayed for judgment in the alternative, 
either Mr. Grant or the corporation." 
The Oourt : "He hasn't been garnished, has 
he~" 
Mr. Swan: "Yes, I think your file will show 
two garnishments, Your Honor, one against the 
corporate defendant and one against Grant per-
sonally." 
The Court: "Oh yes, I see; and what does 
he answer personally~ That he owed nothing~" 
Mr. Swan: "They both ·answered that they 
were not indebted." 
The Third Judicial District Court Rules of Practice 
effective June 1, 1942 do not outline the procedure that 
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1s to be followed in setting for hearing the traverse of 
a garnishment. Rule 64 D (h) is sornewhat vague in that 
it states, "and the matter thus at issue shall be tried in 
the same manner as other issues of like nature." The 
Clerk of the District Court informed the writer that the 
procedure has been, as long as he recollects, to set the 
traverse to a garnishment on the Law and Motion Cal-
endar. It is reasonable that if a party desires to demand 
a trial, this demand might be made prior to the date set 
for hearing, which would make necessary the setting of 
the case on the trial calendar. A demand for trial was 
not made in the instant case, although Grant admits he 
was served with a notice which stated: 
"To the defendant, Thurman E. O'Neil, and 
to Dale E. Grant, and Utah Cash Register Ex-
change, Inc., a corporation, garnishees : 
"You will please take notice that on Aprill8, 
1955, at two o'clock p.m. plaintiff will call up in 
the Law and Motion Division of the above en-
titled Court a hearing to determine the indebted-
ness, if any, due Thurman E. O'Neil by the garni-
shees above." 
As to notice of what was to transpire at the hearing, 
it is further submitted that the subpoena served on Grant 
April 16, 1955, required him to "bring with you check 
books on personal accounts showing disbursements in the 
past six months; check books on Utah Cash Register Ex-
change, Inc., accounts showing disbursements in the past 
six months; ledger of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.; 
cancelled checks showing payments, if any, to Thurman 
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E. O'Neil on moneys owed him by Dale E. Grant or Utah 
Cash Register Exchange, Inc." It would not require 
much thought after reading the quotation above for Grant 
to determine that he would be called upon at the hearing 
to account as to his personal liability, if any, to O'Neil 
as well as the liability of his corporation. The transcript 
of the proceeding indicates that the hearing was carried 
on after the manner of a trial with opportunity for cros-s-
examination and argument. No objection to the proce-
dure was even intimated. It is incredible that the defend-
ants and their counsel could have sat for two hours in 
that proceeding and then, in their brief, eontend that "it 
was only afterward when appellant and his counsel exa-
mined the file that it became fully clear that the appel-
lants had been submitted to an actual trial on the 'Reply 
to Answers to Garnishment' which had never been served 
on them." 
As to the proceeding following the theory as set 
forth in plaintiff's reply to answers of garnishees, the 
record is clear that the indebtedness of Grant andjor 
Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. to O'Neil grew out 
of a loan by O'Neil of some $3,000.00, and also the value 
of the stock of merchandise and equipment transferred in 
apparent violation of the Bulk Sales Act of Utah and 
contributed to Grant's business. The allegation in de-
fendants' brief that plaintiff's witness E. L. White ac-
tually held a bill of sale to the merchandise appellants 
actually did have in their possession is true in a sense 
only, since E. L. White did not hold a bill of sale, but a 
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doctunent entitled bill of sale, taken f'Or security pur-
poses only (R. 67), which clearly should be viewed as a 
chattel mortgage. The answer of Utah Cash Register 
Exchange, Inc. to the Writ of Garnishment stating that 
it "had in its possession items listed in your praecipe of 
March 15 subject to a bill of sale in favor of Mr. E. F. 
White, apparently for security reasons," is an admission 
by defendant that they were aware of the nature of the 
document. 
It is true that the reply to answers of garnishees 
contended Utah Cash Register, Inc. was the alter ego 
of appellant Dale E. Grant. The Trial Court so f'Ound. 
The portion of the transcript quoted in appellants' brief 
wherein the witness 'Snyder was asked: "Q: And did 
1\fr. Grant on that occasion state the reason for the in-
corporation of Utah Cash Register~ A: Well, I presume 
limited liability is the understanding that I had out of 
the conversation", can mean many things. Plaintiff con-
cedes that limited liability is a legitimate purpose for 
incorporation, and that, presumably, all of the stock in 
a corporation could be held by one individual and yet 
a Court find the corporation a ·separate entity from the 
person owning those shares. But the transcript read as 
a whole clearly reveals the reason for the incorporation 
of Utah Cash Register Exchange. The question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding that Utah 
Cash Register Exchange, Inc. was the alger ego of Dale 
E. Grant will he discussed hereafter. 
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The due process of law provision of Section 7, Ar-
ticle 1, Constitution of the State of Utah, and the pro-
vision of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States do not guarantee to an individual either 
a trial by jury ( 67 A.L.R .. 1075, 91 A.L.R. 7 4) or the op-
portunity to use the pretrial techniques of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules which fol-
low them in substance. 
The appellants cite 88 A.L.R. 1148 as supporting the 
proposition that a garnishment proceeding should be set 
on the trial calendar, "particularly if the garnishee de-
mands the same." Plaintiff concedes that if the defend-
ants demand a trial setting it is proper that the same 
should be given, but the opportunity was given the de-
fendants in this proceeding to demand a trial setting on 
the regular trial calendar and they did nothing. 
It is further submitted that the traverse of a garni-
shment is in the nature of a proceeding supplemental to 
judgment. Some courts in this country have ruled that 
the garnishees are not entitled to a jury trial because 
the nature of a garnishment proceeding is that of a pro-
ceeding supplemental to judgment (88 A.L.R. 1148). As 
stated in the case of Huntington vs. Bishop, 5 Vermont 
186 (1832), "the proceeding against the trustee (garnish-
ee) is a mere incident to the principal suit. This proceed-
ing, as already observed, is a creature of the statute, a 
part of the attachment law; and the object of it is mere-
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ly to secure the estate of Spooner (the trustee) to re-
spond to the judgment which may be recovered in the 
principal suit." 
There is an issue involved in every hearing on an 
order for supplemental proceedings, pursuant to Rule 69 
(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, yet these hearings 
are normally set in the Law and Motion Division of the 
Court and in many cases, a defendant's rights to ce~tain 
property are affected by the determination of the J'udge. 
It seems that due process of law is fully met by service 
of the notice of the hearing itself, with an opportunity 
for cross-examination at the hearing, without the require-
ment of a notice setting forth the theory on which the 
plaintiff intends to proceed at the hearing. 
Rule 64 D (h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stat-
ing that "Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or 
finding the same as if the garnishee had answered ac-
cording to such verdict or finding," indicates that the 
rule contemplates a proceeding in the nature of a trial, 
and further, a jury trial, if it is demanded. The plaintiff 
does not deny that this is probably a correct construction 
of the rule, but, as a complete answer states that the de-
fendants had the opportunity to demand a trial setting, 
a jury, and anything further that the Utah Rule's of Civil 
Procedure give c'Ontesting parties in a law suit. A read-
ing of the transcript in the light of the contents of papers 
that had been served on defendants Grant and Utah Cash 
Register Exchange, leave one with the impression that 
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Grant, knowing what was to transpire at the hearing on 
Aprill8, 1955, waived all of the benefits he now seeks, by 
appearing with counsel and submitting to a trial on the 
merits. As an afterthought, when a sizeable judgment 
is awarded against him, he then seeks to show that he 
had no notice of the proceeding. The only thing that can 
be complained of is the alleged failure of the plaintiff 
to serve Grant with a copy of the reply to answers of 
garnishee and the only statement in the record on this 
subject is the self-serving affidavit of Grant. His attor-
ney could not be sure to this day whether Grant actually 
received a copy of the reply. 
II. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
THE DEFENDANTS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF 
THAT AMOUNT ADMITTED AS OWING IN THE ANSWERS 
OF GARNISHEES. 
The contention of the defendants that the failure 
of plaintiff, if any, to serve the reply upon the garnishees 
was jurisdictional falls when it is considered that the 
garnishee defendants with their counsel appeared on 
the date for hearing and submitted themselves to a 
trial on the merits without at any point in the proceed-
ing voicing protest to .the jurisdiction of the District 
Court. Grant~s appearance with his attorney and hi's 
participation in the garnishment proceeding constituted 
a general appearance. The test for determining when 
such a general appearance has occurred has been said 
to be whether the complaining party has taken any 
action "which recognizes the case as in court." Stat,e 
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ex rel. Northwestern Coloniza,tion & Improvement Co. of 
Chihuahrua vs. Hull, et al., 168 P. 5128, (New Mexico, 
1917), Rammond, et al vs. District Court of Eighth 
Judicial District of New Mexico et al, 228 P. 758 (New 
Mexico, 1924). The Supreme Court of Idaho has decided 
that participation in a trial by examining and cross-
examining witnesses constituted a general appearance. 
Poage vs. Co-operative Publishing Co., et 1al., 66 P. 2d 
1119, 110 A.L.R. 1322 ( 1937). 
The appellants need not have had much foresight 
to suppose that what plaintiff was seeking was not a 
judgment awarding them the equipment which Grant 
had admitted as being on his premises, and which he 
conveniently stated was not claimed by Utah Cash Reg-
ister Exchange, Inc., but rather, to impose additional 
liability on the defendants because of an indebtedness 
to O'Neil. Pursuant to Rule 64 D (h), "Judgment was 
entered upon the finding the same as if the garnishees 
had answered according to the finding." The plaintiff 
was entitled to, a judgment for such amount as the Court 
should find was due and owing O'Neil by the garnishee 
defendants, without being limited in any manner by the 
answers of the garnishees to the writs. 
III. EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH 
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER 
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, BUT THE FINDING WAS NOT, 
AT ANY RATE, ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST GRANT PERSONALLY. 
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The stoek distribution of the corporation ( 495 shares 
to Grant, 2 shares to his brother-in-law and 3 shares to 
his wife) admittedly would not, in and of itself, support 
the finding, but with a background of the steps that were 
taken in order to conceal O'Neil's assets from his cred-
itors and dispose of them through a newly organized 
corporation in which O'Neil appeared neither as an 
owner or stockholder, the purpose of the organization 
of the corporation by Grant can be readily inferred. Con-
sider the following: The transfer of the equipment from 
the Provo, Utah store to Utah Cash Register Exchange 
was never evidenced by a bill of sale ( R. 43, 93). The 
amount which Grant or Utah Cash Register Exchange 
agreed to pay O'Neil for his contribution in cash and 
equipment was never reduced to writing, except for the 
notes made by Snyder when requested to arbitrate, 
because, according to Snyder, ":Mr. O'Neil had too many 
creditors, I believe looking for him at that particular 
time to show where he had any assets." (R. 50). There 
was no opening inventory taken at the time Utah Cash 
Register began its existence, and Snyder indicated that 
the reason for taking no inventory was for the same 
reason that money owed O'Neil was not reduced to 
writing (R. 50). Dale Grant personally helped E. F. 
White, Mr. O'Neil and White's brother-in-law transfer 
merchandise from the Provo store to Utah Cash Regis-
ter at 153 East 2nd South, Salt Lake City (R. 59') and 
knew O'Neil was insolvent (R. 93). The transfer of 
the equipment was made sometime during the month 
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of July and the corporation commenced doing business 
August 1, 19·54. On direct examination Grant admitted 
·that the figure of $3600.00 or thereabouts arrived at as 
the figure owed O'Neil by Grant was "high and en-
compassed so much of it being the equipment." (R. 76). 
Clearly Grant intended to pay for the equipment which 
he was using in his business, although he disputes the 
figure arrived at. It appeared that the valuable Sweda 
franchise which O'Neil owned while doing business in 
Provo would be lost unless an outlet were found in the 
area for the· distribution of Sweda Cash Registers 
through a corporation or business entity with O'Neil's 
name completely out of the picture (R. 80). At the 
start of the busineS's, according to Grant, "we had some 
Sweda Cash Registers. * * * I presume they were from 
his (O'Neil's) Salt Lake store" (R. 81). On August 4, 
shortly after the corporation was organized, Grant re-
deemed a mortgage at the Woods Cross bank using 
$3,000.00 in cash turned over to him by O'Neil, and 
which mortgage covered Sweda Cash Registers which 
had a valuation in excess of the amount paid to redeem 
them. (R·. 81). These Swedas became part of the mer-
chandise sold at Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., 
yet no bill of sale or other orderly transfer was made 
from O'Neil to Grant. A chattel mortgage covering 
certain Sweda Gash Registers previously belonging to 
O'Neil was executed to a Mrs. Cottle, which mortgage 
was outstanding at the time of the hearing, and the note 
supporting such chattel mortgage was signed personally 
by Grant, Snyder and O'Neil (R. 92, 99). 
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The question whether a corporation should be dis-
regarded depends upon questions of fact. 1 Fletcher on 
Corporations, Sec. 41. This Court h'as stated in the case 
of Western Securities Company vs. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 
632, 221 P. 8: 
"That, under certain circumstances, the legal 
entity ·of a corporation must be entirely disre-
garded was clearly pointed ·out by the Court in the 
case first cited above (Louisville Banking Com-
pany vs. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 2'1 S.W. 531, 1049). 
The courts have had frequent occasion to con-
sider facts and circumstances similar or anala-
gous to those in ·the case at bar, and to ·apply the 
law to such facts and circumstances. It would 
be a mere travesty of justice if courts could or 
should refuse to look behind the mere form ·of a 
transaction in order to ascertain the real truth, 
and reach and hold responsible the real parties 
in interest. * * * 
''In the case of First National Bank vs. Treb-
lin Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 59 N.E. 834, the proposi-
tion that a corporate entity may be entirely dis-
regarded in order to reach and protect the real 
parties in interest and to disclose the real trans-
action is well illustrated and applied. See also 
In re l\luncy Pulp Co., 139 F·. 546, 71 C. C. A. 530. 
In 14 C. J., Sec. 21, page 61, the law is stated 
thus: 'The abstraction of the corporate entity 
should never be allowed to bar out and prevent 
the real and obvious truth'." 
It was certainly apparent from the facts disclosed 
at the hearing that Dale Grant, as well as O'Neil and 
Snyder, used the corporate entity as a channel through 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
which they might conduct their personal business. The 
transcript shows that it was O'Neil and Grant who 
made the contributions in money and other property 
to the corporation which enabled it to commence its 
operation, yet the record is entirely silent as to any 
stock ownership in O'Neil. On the other hand the record 
is silent as to any contribution other stockholders, mem-
bers of Grant's family, made in consideration for their 
stoek. 
The ease of Ge;ary vs. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. 2d 
396, involved a case of family ownership of the shares 
of a corporation and an attempt to disregard the cor-
porate entity and hold the individuals liable. The Court 
at page 273 stated: 
"A showing that Cain owns all, or substan-
tially all, of the outstanding shares of the Doris 
Trust Company, or that the persons in whose 
names they stand hold the same in trust for him, 
is vital to the plaintiff's ease under her first 
theory. Courts of equity and courts of law as 
well, and courts which administer both law and 
equity in the same action, as do the courts of 
this state, will, to prevent fraud and accomplish 
justice, in proper cases ignore the legal fiction 
that a corporation is a person separate and dis-
tinct from the person or group of persons who 
own its stock. Western Securities Co. vs. Spiro, 
62 Utah 62:3, 221 P. 85·6 ; D. I. Felsenthal Oo. vs. 
Northern Assurance Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 268, 
1 ALR 602, and annotation on page 610. It is 
this doctrine which the plaintiff would have us 
apply in this case. It would be applicable, assum-
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ing that all other necessary facts appear, if Gain 
in fact ·owned the stock or if his three children 
who appear to own the shares, were shown to be 
mere trustees for him in the ownership thereof. 
But otherwise such doctrine can have no appli-
cation. The corporate entity cannot be ignored 
where, as here appears, the stock is owned by the 
-children, and it does not appear that they hold 
title to the shares in trust for their father. (Cit-
ing cases.) The doctrine is generally applied by 
the courts when they have to deal with what in -col-
loquial language are called 'one man' corpora-
tions. It is not necessarily applied when they are 
dealing with what are called 'family' corpora-
tions. The corporation whose affairs were in-
volved in Western Securities Co. vs. Spiro, supra, 
is typical of the former kind; the one involved 
in Elenkrieg vs. Siebrecht is typical of the latter. 
The doctrine simply means that the courts, ignor-
ing forms and looking to the substance of things, 
will regard the stockholders of a corporation as 
the owners of its property, or as the real parties 
in interest, whenever it is necessary to do ·so to 
prevent a fraud which might otherwise be perpe-
trated, to redress a wrong which might otherwise 
go without redress, or to do justice which might 
otherwise fail." 
In the Cain case, the children owned all but one 
share of the corporation stock, and it did not appear 
from the evidence that the shares were held in trust 
for the defendant, Addison Cain. It is submitted that 
in the instant case the stock distribution, coupled with 
the facts set forth above, present sufficient grounds. 
for the Court to "ignore the form and look to the sub-
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stance of things" and "regard the stockholder (in this 
case Grant) as the owner of its property or as the real 
party in interest, in order to prevent a fraud which might 
otherwise he perpetrated." 
It should he kept in mind that the discretion of the 
court is, to a great extent, applied in the matter of 
disregarding the corporate entity. As stated in the case of 
Scola vs. IJ![ errill, 91 Utah 253, 301; 64 P. 2d 185, "There 
should and must he as much elasticity in the application 
of that principle as there is ingenuity in the attempts 
to prostitute the fiction to the accomplishment of wrong-
ful purposes. Each case must be determined upon its 
own facts." It is further submitted that the Trial Court, 
having an opportunity to appraise the witnesses before 
it at the trial, could discern from their demeanor, as 
well as from their response to questions asked, whether 
they were telling the truth regarding the transactions. 
Finally, the plaintiff need not rely on the finding 
by the T'rial Court that Utah Cash Register Exchange, 
Inc. was the alter ego of Dale E. Grant in order to sup-
port the judgment against Grant personally. Snyder 
testified for plaintiff that Grant was indebted to O'Neil 
in December of 1954 in the amount of $3,020.00, which 
sum "represents the money that O'Neil gave Mr. Grant 
to pay off a certain mortgage, chattel mortgage at 
Farmers State Bank" (italics ours). The loan of money 
was presumably to Grant personally, there appearing 
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no promissory note to clarify whether the lmm ~~T<l ~ 
made to Grant or to the corporate entity. A notion of 
the way in which Grant himself treated the money loaned 
by O'Neil is revealed at page 77 of the transcript where 
Gran't makes the statement, "He loaned me some money 
at the start of my organization, and the object I think 
that he, O'Neil, had was to provide himself with some 
form of employment or commission basis, that I told 
him he could work on commission if he wished, and 
provide a j·ob" (italics ours). 
CONCLUSION 
It is anything hut true that the procedure followed 
in the instant case illustrated "an attempt by plaintiff's 
counsel to dispense with court procedure as some nec-
essary evil to he dispensed with by sleight of hand." 
When the entire record and transcript are studied, it 
becomes apparent that the defendants were given notice 
of the hearing and substantial information concerning 
what was to transpire at the hearing in order to afford 
them due process. The Court had jurisdiction over the 
proceeding and heard the testimony of witnesses for 
both sides and ruled on the matter after hearing argu-
ments of counsel. The entire picture presented at the 
hearing was one of an attempt at evasion of the Bulk 
Sales Law of Utah coupled with an attempt by O'Neil 
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and Grant, et al, to conceal from O'Neil's creditors the 
assets of the A-1 Typewriter Stores in Salt Lake eity 
and Provo. As the Trial Court remarked after award-
ing judgment against Grant for the benefit of Remington 
Rand, Inc., "When you play with fire, you're apt to get 
burned." 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, T:HURMAN, 
WORSLE'Y & SNOW and 
ALLEN M. SWAN, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
1501 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, U tall 
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